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Canadian Personal Data Protection Legislation
and Electronic Health Records: Transfers of




There is an inevitable tension between the promotion of societal benefits that
arise from the free-flow of information, and the protection of individual privacy
and personal data.1 This is so in any sector, but both elements of the dichotomy are
heightened when the context is the healthcare sector and the information in ques-
tion is personal health information. There is a distinct interest in having accurate,
readily accessible information available to health professionals because the lives
and physical well-being of patients are at stake. Timely access to an individual’s
health history could mean the difference between life and death. To this end, there
has been a great deal of interest in establishing a national electronic health record
(“EHR”) by which health information could be easily shared by health practition-
ers. However, there is also a keen concern in protecting, limiting and constraining
the disclosure of that same data since information regarding health is among the
most sensitive information available about an individual. Unauthorized disclosure
of the fact that an individual has, for example, a mental health condition or a poten-
tially stigmatizing disease such as HIV can have serious negative social, profes-
sional and economic consequences for the individual.
Personal data protection and privacy of personal health information in the
electronic era is a broad topic that includes consent, security measures and access
considerations. The focus of this article is on one component of the larger picture:
data transfers of personal health information that occur in the context of informa-
tion technology (“IT”) outsourcing. If the societal good envisioned by an inter-ju-
* Dara Lambie is an articling student at Blake, Cassels and Graydon LLP in Toronto.
Thanks to Elizabeth McNaughton and Margaret Wilkinson and anonymous peer
reviewers for their helpful comments.
1 This tension can be seen clearly in one of the earliest articulations of personal data
protection; The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guide-
lines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Paris:
OECD, 1981) [OECD Guidelines]. The dual purpose of the OECD guidelines is to
protect the “fundamental human right” of privacy inherent in personal data, and to pro-
mote the cross-border flow of information. It was recognized that the two concepts
were interlinked and that the latter is potentially at odds with the former. See also Of-
fice of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Processing Personal Data Across Bor-
ders Guidelines (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2009) at 4
[PIPEDA Guidelines].
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risdictional EHR is to be fully realized, then the necessity of outsourcing is a reality
that must be addressed.
I. THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD
The Office of the Health and Information Highway of Health Canada has de-
fined an EHR as “a health record of an individual that is accessible online, from
many separate, interoperable automated systems within an electronic network.”2
Canada Health Infoway, the non-profit corporation established by the federal gov-
ernment to help realize a pan-Canadian EHR, describes it as “a secure, digital re-
cord of [an individual’s] medical history, stored and shared via a network of EHR
systems.”3 The essential element of an EHR is that it is an electronic record that
contains personal health information collected over a period of time (an indivi-
dual’s life) that can be accessed by a health professional. An EHR is a network that
can be accessed or amended by different health care providers, at different times
and in different locations, and is not a single database.4
The goal of a coordinated, national electronic health information network is
principally to promote enhanced patient care by ensuring that information about the
patient is complete, accurate, current and readily accessible.5 This is especially crit-
ical in emergency situations where decisions must be made quickly and often with-
out the benefit of input from the patient himself or herself. Proponents also cite
increased efficiencies when data is readily available to a number of care providers.
Time and resources are saved when care of a patient is transferred from one indivi-
dual or organization to another, if the whole of a patient’s history does not have to
be orally or manually conveyed. This kind of administrative simplification has the
potential to significantly reduce the global costs of providing healthcare. While this
monetary benefit may be secondary to the importance of timely and appropriate
care of the individual, the broader social good cannot be ignored.6
Historically, the development of a nation-wide, coordinated EHR has been an
official government objective. The federal and provincial governments have pro-
2 Office of the Health and Information Highway, Health Canada, Toward Electronic
Health Records (Ottawa: Office of the Health and Information Highway, 2001) at 9.
3 Canada Health Infoway, online: About Electronic Health Records
<http://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/lang-en/about-ehr>. See also Canada Health In-
foway Inc., White Paper on Information Governance of the Interoperable Electronic
Health Record (EHR), March 2007.
4 See Anthony A. Morris, “The Electronic Health Record in Canada: The First Steps”
(2005) 14:2 Health Law Review 14.
5 Ibid. at 14; Nola M. Ries & Geoff Moysa, “Legal Protections of Electronic Health
Records: Issues of Consent and Security” (2005) 14:1 Health Law Review 18; Law-
rence Gostin, “Health Information Privacy” (1994) 80 Cornell L. Rev 451 at 455-456.
6 Indeed, in Gostin, ibid., the emphasis of the tension is between an individual’s interests
in privacy of health records and the public or societal good, while other commentators
have highlighted the tension as between two competing interests of private individuals;
individual patient care being paramount over more general societal benefits. See Ries
& Moysa, ibid.; Morris, supra note 4; Glenn Griener, “Electronic Health Records as a
Threat to Privacy” (2005) 14.1 Health Law Review 14.
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vided much of the impetus and funding for a coordinated network. However, digi-
talization of health records by individuals and organizations for their own purposes
and general record keeping was, and is, inevitable. The practices of individual orga-
nizations, outside of direct government initiatives, to create an EHR raise many of
the same issues of privacy and data protection. Laws that deal with personal data
protection of health information apply to EHRs and this is probably where they will
come to light most often in the future given the complex nature, vast amounts of
data, and multitude of players in such health infrastructure systems. However, per-
sonal data protection legislation also applies to organizations that hold personal
health information that is not a part of a patient care network and to non-electronic
records, to the extent that they continue to exist. The following discussion will con-
sider both of these scenarios, although they are unarguably interconnected.
II. PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION OVERVIEW
Personal data protection legislation is enacted at both federal and provincial
levels and applies to both public and private sector organizations. All of the acts
apply, in varying ways, the principles articulated in the Guidelines on the Protec-
tion of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data7 developed and propa-
gated by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. These
guidelines cover issues such as the collection of data, quality maintenance, security
safeguards and a right of individuals to access their own information. For the pur-
poses of this analysis, primary consideration is given to the provisions that regulate
the use and disclosure of information since these are applicable to IT outsourcing
arrangements. A “use” refers to the kinds of things companies do with information
to accomplish their own objectives and meet their own needs. “Disclosure” occurs
when information is transferred to another organization that will make use of the
information for other purposes unrelated to those of the original organization.
Federally, the Privacy Act,8 the earliest of personal data protection legislation
enacted in Canada, regulates the federal public sector. Each province also has per-
sonal data protection legislation that applies to provincial government organiza-
tions. The Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act, (“PIPEDA”)9 reg-
ulates the private sector. PIPEDA applies not only to the federally regulated private
sector, but also includes the provincial private sector, although it provides that cer-
tain classes of organizations and activities may be exempt from PIPEDA if there is
provincial legislation that applies to that organization or activity and is substantially
similar to PIPEDA.10 Currently, Alberta,11 British Columbia12 and Quebec13 have
7 OECD Guidelines, supra note 1.
8 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
9 S.C. 2000, c. 5.
10 Ibid., section 26(2)(b).
11 Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5.
12 S.B.C. 2003, ch. 63.
13 An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, R.S.Q.
c. P-39.1.
88   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [8:1 C.J.L.T.]
provincial private sector personal data protection legislation that has been declared
substantially similar to PIPEDA.
In Ontario,14 Alberta,15 Manitoba,16 and Saskatchewan17 there is personal
data protection legislation that is specific to the health sector. It applies to certain
designated public and private bodies that collect, use and disclose personal health
information. In Ontario, the Personal Health Information Act has been declared
substantially similar to PIPEDA and so replaces it in the designated health sector
with respect to information held in Ontario. In the other provinces, the health legis-
lation has not been declared substantially similar so the applicable private and pub-
lic sector personal data protection laws that apply in addition to health-sector-spe-
cific laws. In provinces where there is no health-specific personal data protection
legislation, health information is governed by the applicable public and private sec-
tor data protection legislation.
In this paper, the discussion of IT outsourcing and information transfer within
that context will focus on three jurisdictions within Canada: British Columbia, On-
tario and the federal PIPEDA as it applies in provinces without substantially similar
legislation and to information transferred across jurisdictional borders. There are
both historical and conceptual reasons for these choices. British Columbia was the
first place in Canada where the cross-jurisdictional flow of health information in an
IT-outsourcing context came into the national public consciousness and it has been
extensively addressed by the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British
Columbia and by the British Columbia Legislature. The Ontario privacy commis-
sioner has also dealt, more recently, with IT outsourcing issues that apply directly
to the establishment of a province wide EHR. These jurisdictional choices also
make sense from a conceptual point of view. Ontario has health-sector-specific per-
sonal data protection legislation, the Personal Health Information Protection Act,18
which has been declared substantially similar to the federal PIPEDA, and this regu-
lates entities who are defined in the legislation as “health information custodians”
(“HIC”). This designation applies to both public and private bodies and individuals.
On the other hand, in British Columbia, personal information is governed, gener-
ally, in the public sector by the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act19 and in the private sector by the Personal Information Protection Act,20 and
health information is covered by one or the other, depending on what type of organ-
ization holds it. These two jurisdictions represent two unique schemas under which
personal health information is regulated in two different provinces. PIPEDA, en-
acted by the federal government, applies to the private sector in provinces where
there is no substantially similar legislation and where information is transferred
across jurisdictional borders. Consideration of PIPEDA will, therefore, provide fur-
ther contrast to the other legislative schemes discussed. It is beyond the scope of
14 S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sch. A.
15 Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, Ch. H-5.
16 Personal Health Information Act, C.C.S.M., Ch. P33.5.
17 Health Information Protection Act, S.S. 1999, Ch. H-0.02.
18 Supra note 14.
19 R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 165.
20 Supra note 12.
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this article to canvas the personal data protection laws of each Canadian jurisdic-
tion exhaustively; however, as representatives of the different legislative schemes
in place in Canadian provinces, a discussion that focuses on the three jurisdictions,
described above, will highlight the various elements that must be addressed when
implementing an IT outsourcing agreement.
III. IT OUTSOURCING
Virtually any function performed by employees of a company can be out-
sourced to a third party with expertise in that particular area. Outsourcing is prima-
rily done to cut costs. Specialized companies can often perform certain functions
more cheaply than in-house employees. In the IT field, the need for specialization
and training means that it is not just costs that are a consideration, but also the fact
that sometimes the work cannot be done in-house to the same level of service or
expertise.21
With respect to outsourcing of personal health information, there are a variety
of schemes and formats that can be applied. For instance, the outsourcing could be
done by a third party for a single organization, or the IT provider’s services may be
employed at a higher point in the organizational structure, for example, in connec-
tion with networks that exist between individual organizations. The function per-
formed could be discrete and specific, such as billing a set of clients, or it could be
of a more underlying structural nature, such as providing and maintaining the
software and infrastructure by which an entire network operates. In addition, the
manner in which data is accessed or transferred may differ. If the function of the IT
provider involves data processing or storage, then data may be fully transferred to
the third party and stored on its servers, completely separate from the providing
organization. On the other hand, where the service provided is of a more structural
nature, such as where the provider is setting up an entire system or network, then
data may never even actually be transferred outside of the original organization, but
may be accessed by the third party provider, for example, to enter the data into the
system.22 There could also be an in-between ground where data is transferred and
stored on third party servers, but is fully accessible remotely by the providing or-
ganization. In addition to all of these permutations, it is important to bear in mind
that when the information in question is personal health information, the organiza-
21 C. Ian Kyer, Outsourcing Transactions: A Practical Guide (Aurora: Canada Law
Book, 2006) at 1–3.
22 The former structure described here, wherein a third party contractor receives discrete
collections of data and processes it independently of the providing organization, is
likely representative of an older model of information handling where companies
would routinely have their data processing needs met by an external “service bureau”
because personal or small scale computing was simply not available or feasible for
most organizations — see Kyer, ibid., at 1-2. Although this kind of one-off service pro-
vision is still prevalent, the latter structure is likely to become more widespread given
the modern and increasingly greater networking capacities and the ability to construct
integrated infrastructure. In the future, there is likely to be a greater demand for compa-
nies to provide data hosting services and software set-up and maintenance services.
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tions involved may be either in the public sector or in the private sector or, where
networking functions are the subject of the IT work being done, both.
IV. TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION AND
CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS
(a) British Columbia
In 2004, the British Columbia provincial government began making plans to
retain a contractor to run the province’s public health insurance program. This plan
came into the public consciousness because the organization with which the out-
sourcing contract was to be made was a United States based company. A lawsuit
was launched by the British Columbia Public Employee’s Union in the British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court protesting the proposed agreement. The main issue that
emerged as a concern of the public and the media was the possibility that the per-
sonal health information of British Columbians could be accessed by the United
States government by operation of the USA Patriot Act.23 In response to these con-
cerns, the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia initiated a
public enquiry that received many submissions, from both national and interna-
tional sources, and culminated in a report24 that considered the operation of the
USA Patriot Act and its implications in public sector outsourcing.
The USA Patriot Act was enacted by U.S. Congress in very short order after
September 11, 2001. It is a piece of anti-terrorism legislation that expands the intel-
ligence gathering and surveillance powers of American law enforcement and na-
tional security agencies.25 The provision of the legislation that has caused the most
unease in Canada, because of its potential impact even within Canadian borders, is
section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. This section amends sections 501–503 of the
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”)26 expanding the au-
thority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make an application to a court for
an order (“FISA order”) requiring the production of “any tangible thing” for an
investigation to protect against international terrorism. As a result of these amend-
ments, search, seizure, and disclosure orders can be issued in circumstances that
would not be sufficient to allow access by the government in Canada. The primary
concern for Canadians is, of course, the possibility that a FISA order could effect
disclosure of information about Canadians when an individual or organization that
23 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, U.S. H.R. 3162, S.
1510, Public Law 107-56 [USA Patriot Act].
24 Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Privacy and the US Pa-
triot Act: Implications for British Columbia Public Sector Outsourcing (British Colum-
bia: Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, 2004) [B.C. Report].
25 The USA Patriot Act is not actually a single freestanding piece of legislation but rather
is a series of amendments to other pieces of security and surveillance legislation. How-
ever, current commentary usually refers just to the Patriot Act and the amendments that
it engendered.
26 50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.
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is subject to U.S. jurisdiction is in possession of, or has access to, that
information.27
The Information and Privacy Commissioner’s report addressed two “cross-
border” scenarios that could raise USA Patriot Act issues. The first arises where
data is actually transferred to a contracting party that is geographically within the
United States. The second occurs where data remains in Canada but is in the cus-
tody of a company that is either a subsidiary of, or directly controlled by, an Ameri-
can company. A clear answer to the first issue warranted little discussion. Personal
information is subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is geographically
located.28 If those laws allow for, or require, disclosure in a given circumstance,
then any contractual provisions that may provide otherwise cannot prevent disclo-
sure.29 On the second issue, the commission determined that, “[t]here is general
consensus in the submissions that [a U.S. court] could, under FISA, order a US
corporation to produce records held in Canada by its Canadian subsidiary.”30 The
ability to compel such disclosure would depend on practical ability, based on the
degree or extent of corporate control, to obtain and produce the information.31 The
report went on to consider the likelihood that U.S. authorities would use a FISA
court order to access personal data held by Canadian subsidiaries of American
companies. The report concluded that while other avenues such as Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties or letters of request to Canadian courts are available, they are
unlikely to be used in lieu of a FISA order where such an order would be effective
in accessing the information.32 As such, the report found that there is a real possi-
bility that U.S. authorities would use a FISA order to gain access to personal infor-
mation held within Canada by a Canadian subsidiary of an American company.
Nonetheless, the report concluded that “a ban on British Columbia government out-
sourcing of the management of sensitive personal information would not be a prac-
tical or effective plan of action.”33
27 For further consideration of this topic in the outsourcing context, see Adam D. Ver-
eshack, A Practical Guide to Outsourcing Agreements (Markham: LexisNexis But-
terworths, 2005) at 230-231; See also BC report, supra note 24, at 70.
28 B.C. Report, ibid., at 117.
29 Under the provisions of the USA Patriot Act, an organization or company that discloses
information in accordance with the act, is protected from liability if such disclosure
was otherwise contractually prohibited. Such limitation of liability is, of course, only
applicable to a lawsuit brought within the United States and so would not protect a
Canadian subsidiary from civil liability or from liability under Canadian statute.
30 B.C. Report, supra note 24 at 118.
31 Ibid, at 132. Some US courts have held that there is corporate control where a US
corporation, can, directly or indirectly, elect a majority of the directors of the foreign
corporation.
32 Ibid, at 116 and 128; But see Vereshack, supra note 27 at 231 where he contends that
“there is a belief among certain knowledgeable Canadian and U.S. practitioners that if
the United States were to require Personal Information from Canada in connection with
an offence in the United States, it would be much more practical and expeditious to use
the bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, between those two countries to obtain the
required information.”
33 B.C. Report, supra note 24 at 133.
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Perhaps the most significant conclusion of the report was that the provisions
of the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act34
(“FOIPPA”), which regulates data protection in the British Columbia public sector
were not found to be inconsistent with outsourcing generally. The outsourcing of IT
functions that involve the transfer of personal information to third parties is not
prohibited by FOIPPA either expressly or as a consequence of any requirement or
prohibition in the Act. Every province in Canada has legislation that, like FIOPPA,
regulates personal information held by provincial government organizations. Al-
though every province has not had reason or opportunity to examine and report on
how its own legislation would regulate outsourcing, where it has been considered,
it has similarly been concluded that outsourcing is not prohibited outright. The
same conclusion has also consistently been reached with respect to PIPEDA and
other private sector legislation.35
However, in response to the British Columbia Public Employee’s Union law-
suit and the Commissioner’s report, the British Columbia legislature, in October of
2004, enacted several amendments to FOIPPA that further impact outsourcing
agreements.36 Now, under section 30.1 of FOIPPA, public sector entities are re-
quired to ensure that personal information in its custody or control is stored and
accessed only in Canada.37 In addition, public bodies and their third party service
providers are required to refuse to disclose information in response to a foreign
demand38 and are required to report to the Minister responsible for FOIPPA any
demand for information made by a foreign authority. Commentators have observed
that these latter two amendments have the potential to put any U.S. linked company
that might be subject to a U.S. FISA disclosure order in the position of having to
disobey one jurisdiction’s laws in order to comply with another’s.39 In Nova Sco-
34 Supra note 19
35 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, PIPEDA Case Summary #2005-
313, Bank’s notification to customers triggers PATRIOT ACT concerns (Ottawa: Of-
fice of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2005); Office of the Privacy Commis-
sioner of Canada, PIPEDA Case Summary #2006-333, Canadian-based company
shares customer personal information with U.S. parent (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, 2006); Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
PIPEDA Case Summary #2008-394, Outsourcing of canada.com e-mail services to
U.S.-based firm raises questions for subscribers (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada, 2008).
36 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act, 2004, S.B.C. 2004,
c. 64 [Amendment Act].
37 Except when cross-border access/storage is consented to by the individual in a pre-
scribed manner (30.1(a)).
38 Supra note 19; This provision specifically prohibits disclosure which is not authorized
by the act and subject to sections 33.1 and 33.2, which were also amended by the
Amendment Act, supra note 36, such foreign orders do not constitute authorization.
39 Kyer, supra note 21 at 18-6; Richard Corley & Ian Hay, “Privacy and Confidentiality
Issues in Outsourcing Transactions” (Powerpoint Presentation made at IT.Can &
LSUC 7th Annual IT Law Spring Training Program, May 14, 2007), at slides 15-16 &
21.
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tia, the Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act,40 enacted in
2006, contains similar provisions prohibiting the transfer of personal information
held by the public sector outside of the country.
These provisions are significant in that they have the potential to significantly
alter whether, and with whom, public sector players in these jurisdictions choose to,
and are able to, contract for IT outsourcing services. However, from a regulatory
and administrative standpoint, arguably, the more significant amendment to
FOIPPA was to sections 30.1–30.5, which provides that the sections prohibiting
disclosure, mandating notification of foreign disclosure demands and mandating
that information be maintained in Canada, now apply to third party service provid-
ers as well as to the public body that originally held the information. This is signifi-
cant because, previously, only public bodies were governed by the legislation and
third party service providers were bound only by whatever contractual provisions
were in the IT outsourcing contracts themselves.
In contrast, personal information held by private sector organizations in Brit-
ish Columbia is regulated by the Personal Information Protection Act41 (“PIPA”).
The PIPA does not contain any provision that would prohibit outsourcing of per-
sonal information, even across jurisdictional borders. In addition, unlike the
amended FOIPPA, PIPA does not apply directly to third party service providers.
However, PIPA does require that an organization protect information that is in its
control even when the information is not within the custody of the organization,
suggesting that where an organization outsources some function to a third party, it
continues to be responsible for the personal information even when it is in the
hands of the service provider. In this way, PIPA is more similar to the federal
PIPEDA, a point that will be discussed further below.
(b) Ontario
In Ontario, the Personal Health Information Protection Act42 (“PHIPA”), en-
acted in 2004, applies to parties who are defined as “health information custodi-
ans,” which includes hospitals, doctors, pharmacists and laboratories, ambulance
services and, nursing and care homes. Like the amended FOIPPA, PHIPA also con-
tains provisions that apply directly to third party service providers. Section 2 of
PHIPA defines an “agent” as an individual that, “with the authorization of the cus-
todian, acts for, or on behalf of the custodian in respect of personal health informa-
tion for the purposes of the custodian, and not the agent’s own purposes.” Agents
are permitted to collect, use and disclose personal health information only if the
health information custodian is permitted or required to do so under PHIPA.43 It is
also significant that section 6(1) of PHIPA provides that where a health information
custodian provides personal health information to its own agent, this is a “use” of
the information and not a “disclosure.” Therefore, such a transfer must comply with
40 S.N.S. 2006, c. 3.
41 Supra note 12.
42 Supra note 14.
43 Section 17. In addition, many of the provisions of PHIPA that regulate when and how
health information custodians may collect, use and disclose personal information also
apply explicitly to agents of the health information custodian.
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the provisions of PHIPA that regulate the uses that a health information custodian
may make of personal health information44 but is not caught by the much more
strenuous rules regulating disclosure.45 As a whole, these provisions of PHIPA
treat agents of health information custodians as extensions of the custodians.
Agents, themselves, are regulated by PHIPA in that many provisions of PHIPA do
apply directly to them, but the specifics of what agents may do with the information
they receive from custodians is regulated by the constraints of the Act that apply to
the custodians, themselves.
The “agent” provisions of PHIPA could apply to many types of IT outsourcing
transactions, including the kind of agreement considered by the British Columbia
government, discussed above (if it were to have taken place in Ontario). Regula-
tions made pursuant to section 10(4) of PHIPA, define a second type of service
provider, a “health information network provider,” as “a person who provides ser-
vices to two or more health information custodians where the services are provided
primarily to custodians to enable the custodians to use electronic means to disclose
personal health information to one another.”46 The regulations mandate the actions
of the service provider and include, among other things, directives that the service
provider and its employees must not use the information except as necessary in the
course of providing the services, must not disclose the information, and must report
to the health information custodian any unauthorized access of the information.
These provisions would apply to the kind of outsourcing agreement that is imple-
mented at the networking level, as opposed to individual one-off agreements. They
would apply, for example, where the service being provided is for the implementa-
tion of an EHR.47 A “health information network provider” could also be an
“agent”48 and therefore subject to both sets of provisions under PHIPA.
The Information and Privacy Commissioner for Ontario has had cause to con-
sider these provisions in PHIPA in the context of an IT outsourcing agreement that
raised cross-border access concerns.49 In 2006, Cancer Care Ontario entered into an
agreement with a company, Initiate Software, for the provision of software services
that link personal health information to specific individuals such that access to in-
formation about that individual could be accessed across the healthcare sector. In-
44 PHIPA, supra note 14 at s. 37.
45 Ibid. at ss. 38–50.
46 Ontario Regulation 329/04, s. 6.
47 See e.g., Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, Review of the Smart Systems
for Health Agency (SSHA): An Electronic Goods or Services Provider to Health Infor-
mation Custodians under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (To-
ronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, 2007). Smart Systems for
Health Agency, the subject of the review was created by the Province of Ontario to
provide a secure, integrated, province-wide information technology infrastructure
which would be the foundation of an Ontario-wide EHR. This report considers the way
in which the “health information network provider” provisions apply to this agreement.
48 Ontario Regulation 329/04, section 6(2).
49 Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, Investigation Report: PHIPA Report
HI06-45 Initiate Systems Inc. and the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
(Toronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, 2006).
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Q-Tel, which is the venture capital branch of the American Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”) and whose mandate it is to invest in intelligence and information
gathering technology businesses, had recently invested in Initiate Software. This
raised concerns in the public and the media that information to which Initiate
Software was privy could be accessed by American authorities via the CIA’s inter-
est in Initiate. Unlike in British Columbia, the concern here was not with the possi-
bility of a FISA order under the USA Patriot Act, but rather the potential for a more
direct access by a controlling foreign body (which, in this case, happened to be a
foreign governmental organization). Here, the Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner for Ontario found that Initiate Software was an “agent” of Cancer Care On-
tario, as defined by PHIPA and that the agreement between the two parties recog-
nized this arrangement. The services provided by Initiate were limited to
configuring the software, uploading the information and providing troubleshooting
assistance. Initiate performed no remote data hosting or processing functions. In
addition, the agreement provided Initiate Software with very limited access to per-
sonal health information of Ontarians since all work done by Initiate was per-
formed at Cancer Care Ontario sites under the direct supervision of the information
custodian, and there was no capacity for remote access to the system. The Commis-
sioner concluded that, “personal health information [was] not being collected, used,
or disclosed in contravention of PHIPA through the use of Initiate Software in On-
tario, nor [did] any health information leave the province.”50 The contractual provi-
sions contained in the IT outsourcing agreement between Initiate and Cancer Care
Ontario were of great importance to the Commissioner in this case, and it was by
these provisions, and practical confirmations that they were being complied with,
that the Commissioner determined that the agreement was in compliance with
PHIPA.
(c) PIPEDA
As discussed above, personal health information is governed differently in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. The discussion above has focused on British Columbia and On-
tario as representative of two different schemes. In Ontario, PHIPA applies to both
public and private sector organizations who are defined as health information cus-
todians. In British Columbia, FOIPPA regulates public sector organizations while
PIPA applies to private sector organizations. However, the majority of provinces do
not have provincial private sector personal data protection legislation. In these
provinces, the federal PIPEDA applies to such organizations. PIPEDA also applies
as soon as information crosses a border. Therefore, a consideration of an IT out-
sourcing agreement that deals with information that is subject to PIPEDA must be
considered.
In January of 2009, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
(“Commissioner”) published Processing Personal Data Across Borders Guidelines
to “explain how the PIPEDA applies to transfers of personal information to a third
50 Ibid. at 10. There is no indication as to whether the Commissioner would have decided
differently if the information had left the province. PHIPA, unlike FOIPPA, does not
specifically prohibit this and the finding that the information did not leave the province
was central to reasons issued by the Commissioner in this case.
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party, including a third party operating outside of Canada, for processing.”51 These
guidelines summarize several years of decisions by the Commissioner on this
point.52 The guidelines highlight Principle 4.1.3 of Schedule 1 of PIPEDA, which
provides that, “[a]n organization is responsible for personal information in its pos-
session or custody, including information that has been transferred to a third party
for processing. The organization shall use contractual or other means to provide a
comparable level of protection while the information is being processed by a third
party.” Principle 4.1.3 specifically authorizes third party service provider agree-
ments but mandates that: (1) the original organization remains responsible for the
information, and (2) if it enters into agreements with third parties, then the contrac-
tual provisions must ensure that the third party provides the same protections re-
quired of the original organization by PIPEDA.
PIPEDA, unlike FOIPPA or PHIPA, does not directly apply to the third par-
ties. As is the case with PIPA, the third party providers are subject only to contrac-
tual restrictions and not legislative ones. The guidelines confirm that, as under
PHIPA, disclosure to a third party is a “use” of the information and not a “disclo-
sure,” although it is not explicitly stated as such in PIPEDA.
The guidelines recognize that when information is transferred to foreign juris-
dictions, it is subject to the laws of these jurisdictions, and where disclosure is re-
quired under the law of the foreign jurisdiction, this can always override contrac-
tual provisions that purport to prevent disclosure to foreign authorities.
Nonetheless, PIPEDA does not prohibit or restrict such a cross-border transaction.
The guidelines intimate — but do not explicitly state — that in some instances the
risk of disclosure in a foreign jurisdiction might be too great and, especially where
the information is highly sensitive, a private sector organization governed by
PIPEDA ought not to enter into a cross-border information transfer agreement.
Transfers of health information, which is among the most sensitive and private of
personal information, could well be just the sort of information that the guidelines
contemplate on this point, although this is not explicitly stated.53 However, it
seems clear that it is up to the discretion of the individual organization as to
whether the personal information that they hold is too sensitive, or the risk of dis-
closure too high to enter into a cross-border agreement. PIPEDA does not prohibit
it.
On the whole, private sector organizations whose personal information is gov-
erned by PIPEDA (or substantially similar provincial legislation such as the British
Columbia PIPA), are subject to many of the same provisions and restrictions re-
garding use and disclosure in the context of third party IT outsourcing agreements
51 PIPEDA Guidelines, supra note 1 at 2.
52 See supra note 35; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, SWIFT investiga-
tion report addressing disclosure of Canadian banking information to the U.S. Trea-
sury (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, April 2, 2007); Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Transferring Personal Information about
Canadians Across Borders — Implications of the USA PATRIOT Act (Ottawa: Office
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2004).
53 The guidelines do consider financial information that is also highly sensitive and akin,
in some ways, to health information.
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as are public sector organizations under provincial legislation such as FOIPPA, or
health sector specific legislation like PHIPA. All organizations are free to enter into
contracts with third parties for information technology outsourcing or other ser-
vices. In all cases, transfer of information to these third parties is a “use” of the
information and not a “disclosure,” recognizing that the outsourced functions are
still part of the overall operation of the original organization. The parties to whom
the information is transferred are limited in what they can do with it. They can use
the information only for the purposes for which the original organization has been
authorized and for the purposes for which they are retained contractually by the
original organization. However, under PIPEDA or substantially similar legislation,
these restrictions on third parties must be enforced primarily by contractual provi-
sions alone, while under FOIPPA or PHIPA, the third party service providers are,
themselves, regulated (although contractual provisions are still very important to
establish compliance with the legislation). In addition, provincial public sector leg-
islation such as FOIPPA in British Columbia, and Nova Scotia’s Personal Informa-
tion International Disclosure Protection Act,54 specifically prohibit the transfer or
storage of personal information outside of Canada. On the other hand, neither
PIPEDA nor any substantially similar legislation prohibit such transactions.
CONCLUSION
When a Canadian organization that has personal health information is contem-
plating entering into an IT outsourcing agreement that would involve that personal
health information being either transferred to, or accessed by a third party IT ser-
vice provider, there are a number of issues that must be considered. The specific
pieces of legislation and the case studies discussed in this paper have highlighted
some of the most significant of these issues.
It is clear that IT outsourcing is not prohibited outright by any personal data
protection legislation. However, in some jurisdictions, specifically the public sector
in British Columbia and Nova Scotia, there are restrictions on the kind of outsourc-
ing agreement that can be entered into, since data cannot be stored or accessed
outside of Canada. In such a case, restrictions are imposed on the possible structure
of the putative agreements. Even where data is stored only in Canada, parties to
outsourcing agreements that deal with public sector information in these provinces
may face compliance conflicts between laws of different jurisdiction where the
third party service provider is corporately linked to a foreign company. Such a
party would have to consider whether the risk of such a conflict is worth the poten-
tial benefits of the contract.
There are other circumstances where it may not be advisable to enter into a
cross-border transaction, even though it may be allowed. If the information is par-
ticularly sensitive, then the potential harm that could result from a forced foreign
disclosure may outweigh the benefits of the cross-border agreement. If such a trans-
action is not prohibited, the harms to be considered are more diverse than simple
legal repercussions and may include loss of business reputation, client dissatisfac-
tion, and public outcry if disclosure were to occur. Again, a cost/benefit analysis
must be performed by the parties.
54 Supra note 40.
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It is clear that in any outsourcing agreement wherein personal information is
transferred, appropriate contractual provisions are of paramount importance. If the
information falls within the purview of PIPEDA, contractual provisions are the pri-
mary mechanism for controlling the actions of the third party. Appropriate contrac-
tual provisions allow an organization to meet its own obligations under the legisla-
tion to protect the information, even when it is in the hands of a third party. Where
the third party service provider is itself regulated by the applicable personal data
protection legislation, comprehensive contractual provisions are still necessary to
demonstrate compliance with the legislation and to establish the nature of the rela-
tionship between the parties.
Contractual provisions should be specific. A third party service provider will
be hesitant or unwilling to accept vague provisions that merely require, for exam-
ple, “compliance with all applicable laws,”55 since it is the original organization
that is most familiar with the law and its operation in the specific context. Specific-
ity of contractual provisions is especially important under PIPEDA when the onus
is on the original organization to ensure that a “comparable level of protection” is
afforded the information. It is important to be specific as to what that level is, and
how it is achieved.
All of these considerations are essential when an organization is deciding on
the appropriate structure and contractual obligations in an IT outsourcing agree-
ment. However, even when all of these issues are appropriately and comprehen-
sively addressed, they mitigate, but do not fully eliminate the risk of disclosure of
personal health information subject to the operation of a foreign law that binds a
third party IT service provider. Nonetheless, Canadian personal data protection leg-
islation and the judicial and administrative interpretation of it thus far, recognize
that outsourcing agreements are a necessity and an inevitability in the technological
evolution of data management, and especially infrastructure, development. Careful
and appropriate management of these outsourcing and data management and trans-
fer agreements must be in place to realize the potentially life saving and health-care
enhancing benefits of EHRs, while maintaining the security and privacy of the most
sensitive of personal information. 
55 Kyer, supra note 21.
